Paper Assignment 1
Introduction to Theory of Knowledge Paper 1
Due electronically by midnight on Wednesday, November 2
Instructions
Write a paper on one of the following topics. The main goal of your paper should be to critically assess an argument concerning knowledge that can be extracted from one of the following selections. Your paper must contain:
• Your name. Seriously.
• An introduction that tells the reader what you plan to do in your paper.
• A prose summary in your own words of the argument you plan to discuss. If you need to tell a little story in order to set up the argument, this is the place to do it.
• A more formal presentation of the argument you plan to discuss, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid.
• A premise-by-premise explanation and defence of the argument. Explain any technical terms and provide support for each premise. (Recall that what needs explaining depends on your audience. You should take your audience to be an intelligent, interested individual that is not in our class. Don’t assume I’m your audience.) Do not “tell me in other words” what the premise says. Do give me the best reasons you can think of for supposing the premise is correct, whether you think it is or not. Your defence of each premise should be your best answer the question Why think this premise is true?
• A criticism of some premise in the presented argument, explained informally in prose. The criticism should be the best one you can think of. I’m not looking for what others have said here. I’m interested in what you think the best criticism is, whether or not you think the first argument is sound.
• A more formal presentation of your criticism, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid. Its conclusion must be the negation of some premise in the first argument.
• An explanation and defence of the premises in your criticism. Same points that apply to explanation and defence of the first argument apply here as well.
• An overall evaluation: Is your criticism of the original argument sound? Why or why not?
• Citations where appropriate, and a list of references at the end of the paper in APA format. (You do not need to refer to any paper other than the ones excerpted below, though you may if it is appropriate.)
Papers should be submitted by email to chris.tillman@gmail.com as an attachment in .doc, .docx, .pdf, .rtf, or shared with me as a gohttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifogle document by midnight, Wednesday November 2.
Option 1: What Good are Counterexamples? A Defence of TAK
In ‘What Good are Counterexamples?’ Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinburg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, attempts a defence of the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge against Gettier cases. Present and critically evaluate Weatherson’s main argument in defence of TAK.
Weatherson, Brian. 2003. ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’ Philosohical Studies 115(1): 1-31.
Option 2: Developing Feldman’s Modest Proposal
At the end of Chapter 3, Feldman puts forward a “modest proposal”: (EDF) S knows P =df (i) P is true, (ii) S believes P, (iii) S is justified in believing P, and (iv) S’s justification for P does not essentially depend on any falsehood. We said this proposal needs to be clearer before we can properly ehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifvaluate it. Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison, philosophy professors at SUNY-Fredonia, attempt just that in Feit and Cullison (2011). In sections (1-3) (pp. 283-291) of their paper Feit and Cullison develop the best version of (EDF) they can think of and argue that it is false. Critically evaluate Feit and Cullison’s argument.
Feit, Neil and Andrew Cullison. 2011. ‘When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 283-304.
Option 3: Evaluating DJDD
In the remainder of their paper, Feit and Cuhttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifllison (2011) try to develop the “no false grounds” approach in a way that improves on what they take to be the best version of (EDF). The view they settle on is what they call the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ view (DJDD) S knows P iff (i) S believes P, (ii) P is true, (iii) S is justified in believing P, and (iv) no ground that is essential to S’s justification for P justifies S in believing the negation of a defeater. Critically assess their defence of DJDD. They consider some objections and offer replies. Evaluate whether their replies are successful or provide an objection of your own that Feit and Cullison do not consider to DJDD.
Feit, Neil and Andrew Cullison. 2011. ‘When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 283-304.
Option 4: Defeat
The main early competitor to the “no false grounds” approach to knowledge was the “no defeater” approach. The basic idea was that in Gettier cases, there is some true proposition such that if the subject knew it, she would lose justification for her belief. So the thought was that knowledge rehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifquires that there not be anything like that. We presented a precise proposal, (ND), which Lehrer and Paxson (1969) counterexampled. They proposed their own account of defeat. Swain (1974) criticizes Lehrer and Paxon’s account and proposes his own. Critically evaluate Swain’s criticism of Lehrer and Paxton or present your own objection to Swain’s account of defeat.
Swain, Marshall. 1974. ‘Epistemic Defeasibility’. American Philosophical Quarterly 11(1): 15-25.
Option 5: Your Favourite Theory of Knowledge is Wrong
Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinburg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, posted the following to his blog, Thoughts, Arguments and Rants (http://tar.weatherson.org/) on November 19, 2009:
Consider this proposition:
N: Brian does not know that N.
Assume N is false. That is, I know that N. Knowledge is factive, so N. That contradicts our original assumption. So N must not be false. So it follows, at least classically, that N is true. So I don’t know N.
But I can follow the reasoning that showed N is true. And I accept that reasoning, so I believe N. And the reasoning justifies me in believing N. So I have a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge. So the JTB theory of knowledge fails.
My reasoning didn’t go via any false lemmas. It went via a false assumption, but making false assumptions for purposes of reductio is consistent with knowledge. So I have a JTB with no false lemmas, but no knowledge. So much for the JTB+No false lemmas.
[Ernest Sosa (2007) holds that there are two kinds of knowledge: animal knowledge and reflective knowledge.
Subject S has animal knowledge that P if and only if S's belief that P is accurate (true), adroit (manifests an epistemic virtue, skill or competence) and apt (true because competent). Since aptness entails accuracy and adroitness, animal knowledge is apt belief.
S has reflective knowledge that P if and only if: (i) S's belief that P is apt (S has animal knowledge); (ii) S believes that ‘his belief that P is apt’; (iii) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself accurate (true); (iv) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself adroit (manifests a virtue); and (v) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself apt (true because virtuous). –CT]
I’m (generally) a competent logical reasoner. My belief in N, which is a true belief, was a product of my logical competence. Indeed, I formed the belief in N, rather than some alternative, because of that competence.http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif So I should have Sosa-style animal knowledge of N. Indeed, I can reflectively, and aptly, endorse the claim that my belief in N is accurate because it was an exercise of competence. So I should have Sosa-style reflective knowledge that N. But I don’t; clearly I don’t know N.
It seems to me that pretty much any otherwise plausible theory of knowledge will fall this way. Whatever qualities or virtues a belief might have, short of knowledge, my belief in N has. But I don’t know N. Indeed, logic prevents me from knowing N. So any such theory must be false.
Critically assess Weatherson’s argument.
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Web-Only Bonus! Option 6: Critically evaluate a central argument in Jason Stanley's 'Knowing (How)'.
Due electronically by midnight on Wednesday, November 2
Instructions
Write a paper on one of the following topics. The main goal of your paper should be to critically assess an argument concerning knowledge that can be extracted from one of the following selections. Your paper must contain:
• Your name. Seriously.
• An introduction that tells the reader what you plan to do in your paper.
• A prose summary in your own words of the argument you plan to discuss. If you need to tell a little story in order to set up the argument, this is the place to do it.
• A more formal presentation of the argument you plan to discuss, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid.
• A premise-by-premise explanation and defence of the argument. Explain any technical terms and provide support for each premise. (Recall that what needs explaining depends on your audience. You should take your audience to be an intelligent, interested individual that is not in our class. Don’t assume I’m your audience.) Do not “tell me in other words” what the premise says. Do give me the best reasons you can think of for supposing the premise is correct, whether you think it is or not. Your defence of each premise should be your best answer the question Why think this premise is true?
• A criticism of some premise in the presented argument, explained informally in prose. The criticism should be the best one you can think of. I’m not looking for what others have said here. I’m interested in what you think the best criticism is, whether or not you think the first argument is sound.
• A more formal presentation of your criticism, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid. Its conclusion must be the negation of some premise in the first argument.
• An explanation and defence of the premises in your criticism. Same points that apply to explanation and defence of the first argument apply here as well.
• An overall evaluation: Is your criticism of the original argument sound? Why or why not?
• Citations where appropriate, and a list of references at the end of the paper in APA format. (You do not need to refer to any paper other than the ones excerpted below, though you may if it is appropriate.)
Papers should be submitted by email to chris.tillman@gmail.com as an attachment in .doc, .docx, .pdf, .rtf, or shared with me as a gohttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifogle document by midnight, Wednesday November 2.
Option 1: What Good are Counterexamples? A Defence of TAK
In ‘What Good are Counterexamples?’ Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinburg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, attempts a defence of the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge against Gettier cases. Present and critically evaluate Weatherson’s main argument in defence of TAK.
Weatherson, Brian. 2003. ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’ Philosohical Studies 115(1): 1-31.
Option 2: Developing Feldman’s Modest Proposal
At the end of Chapter 3, Feldman puts forward a “modest proposal”: (EDF) S knows P =df (i) P is true, (ii) S believes P, (iii) S is justified in believing P, and (iv) S’s justification for P does not essentially depend on any falsehood. We said this proposal needs to be clearer before we can properly ehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifvaluate it. Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison, philosophy professors at SUNY-Fredonia, attempt just that in Feit and Cullison (2011). In sections (1-3) (pp. 283-291) of their paper Feit and Cullison develop the best version of (EDF) they can think of and argue that it is false. Critically evaluate Feit and Cullison’s argument.
Feit, Neil and Andrew Cullison. 2011. ‘When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 283-304.
Option 3: Evaluating DJDD
In the remainder of their paper, Feit and Cuhttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifllison (2011) try to develop the “no false grounds” approach in a way that improves on what they take to be the best version of (EDF). The view they settle on is what they call the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ view (DJDD) S knows P iff (i) S believes P, (ii) P is true, (iii) S is justified in believing P, and (iv) no ground that is essential to S’s justification for P justifies S in believing the negation of a defeater. Critically assess their defence of DJDD. They consider some objections and offer replies. Evaluate whether their replies are successful or provide an objection of your own that Feit and Cullison do not consider to DJDD.
Feit, Neil and Andrew Cullison. 2011. ‘When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 283-304.
Option 4: Defeat
The main early competitor to the “no false grounds” approach to knowledge was the “no defeater” approach. The basic idea was that in Gettier cases, there is some true proposition such that if the subject knew it, she would lose justification for her belief. So the thought was that knowledge rehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifquires that there not be anything like that. We presented a precise proposal, (ND), which Lehrer and Paxson (1969) counterexampled. They proposed their own account of defeat. Swain (1974) criticizes Lehrer and Paxon’s account and proposes his own. Critically evaluate Swain’s criticism of Lehrer and Paxton or present your own objection to Swain’s account of defeat.
Swain, Marshall. 1974. ‘Epistemic Defeasibility’. American Philosophical Quarterly 11(1): 15-25.
Option 5: Your Favourite Theory of Knowledge is Wrong
Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinburg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, posted the following to his blog, Thoughts, Arguments and Rants (http://tar.weatherson.org/) on November 19, 2009:
Consider this proposition:
N: Brian does not know that N.
Assume N is false. That is, I know that N. Knowledge is factive, so N. That contradicts our original assumption. So N must not be false. So it follows, at least classically, that N is true. So I don’t know N.
But I can follow the reasoning that showed N is true. And I accept that reasoning, so I believe N. And the reasoning justifies me in believing N. So I have a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge. So the JTB theory of knowledge fails.
My reasoning didn’t go via any false lemmas. It went via a false assumption, but making false assumptions for purposes of reductio is consistent with knowledge. So I have a JTB with no false lemmas, but no knowledge. So much for the JTB+No false lemmas.
[Ernest Sosa (2007) holds that there are two kinds of knowledge: animal knowledge and reflective knowledge.
Subject S has animal knowledge that P if and only if S's belief that P is accurate (true), adroit (manifests an epistemic virtue, skill or competence) and apt (true because competent). Since aptness entails accuracy and adroitness, animal knowledge is apt belief.
S has reflective knowledge that P if and only if: (i) S's belief that P is apt (S has animal knowledge); (ii) S believes that ‘his belief that P is apt’; (iii) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself accurate (true); (iv) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself adroit (manifests a virtue); and (v) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself apt (true because virtuous). –CT]
I’m (generally) a competent logical reasoner. My belief in N, which is a true belief, was a product of my logical competence. Indeed, I formed the belief in N, rather than some alternative, because of that competence.http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif So I should have Sosa-style animal knowledge of N. Indeed, I can reflectively, and aptly, endorse the claim that my belief in N is accurate because it was an exercise of competence. So I should have Sosa-style reflective knowledge that N. But I don’t; clearly I don’t know N.
It seems to me that pretty much any otherwise plausible theory of knowledge will fall this way. Whatever qualities or virtues a belief might have, short of knowledge, my belief in N has. But I don’t know N. Indeed, logic prevents me from knowing N. So any such theory must be false.
Critically assess Weatherson’s argument.
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Web-Only Bonus! Option 6: Critically evaluate a central argument in Jason Stanley's 'Knowing (How)'.
posted by Chris Tillman at 12:50 PM
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