Saturday, March 10, 2012

My Attempt against Debasing Demon

Schaffer’s argument:

1) (1) Knowledge requires the production of belief properly based on the evidence.

2) (2) Necessarily, for all beliefs, they can be produced improperly based on the evidence, via guessing or wishful thinking.

3) (3) Necessarily, for all improperly formed beliefs, it is always possible for them to seem later as if one had produced the belief properly based on the evidence.

4) (4) If (1)-(3), then it is impossible to distinguish cases of knowledge from cases of non-knowledge.

5) (5) So, it is impossible to distinguish cases of knowledge from cases of non-knowledge.

My argument denying (3):

6) (6) It is not always possible for improperly formed beliefs to seem later as if one had produced the belief properly.

7) (7) If (6), then it is sometimes possible to distinguish cases of knowledge from non-knowledge.

8) (8) So, it is sometimes possible to distinguish cases of knowledge from non-knowledge.

Thursday, March 08, 2012

C. Smoke attempts debasing demon arguments

Here's my attempt at the debasing demon argument:

Argument

(1) Knowledge requires the production of belief, properly based on the evidence, and any belief can be produced on an improper basis.

(2) If (1), then it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.

(3) Therefore, it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.

(4) When one forms a belief, the debasing demon makes it seem as though it is properly based on the evidence, where it is not properly based on the evidence.

(5) If (3) and (4), then it is the case that no matter what belief you form, there is always the possibility that you cannot be certain that the connection between your belief and evidence is properly based.

(6) Therefore, it is the case that no matter what belief you form, there is always the possibility that you cannot be certain that the connection between your belief and evidence is properly based.


Reply

(1) I believe I exist.

(2) If it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence, and when one forms a belief, the debasing demon makes it seem as though it is properly based on the evidence, where it is not properly based on the evidence, then (1) is based on improper evidence.

(3) It is not the case that (1) is be based on improper evidence.

(4) Therefore, it is not the case that it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence, and when one forms a belief, the debasing demon makes it seem as though it is properly based on the evidence, where it is not properly based on the evidence.


Monday, March 05, 2012

Peer Evaluation

Please check your peer's arguments for deductive validity. It's best if the arguments are represented as fairly simple deductively valid arguments. (Modus ponens, modus tollens, conjunction, and hypothetical syllogism are all commonly used argument forms.) If your peer's argument is invalid, suggest ways of making the argument valid.

Your peer's arguments may also suffer from idle premises: premises that are not required in order to deductively secure the conclusion. Look for these and if you find one, suggest your peer omits it.

Your peer's premises should also make sense to you, whether or not you also worked on your peer's target paper. Trust yourself. If a premise does not make clear sense, don't be shy about saying so. It helps to explain exactly what you find unclear.

If it's mysterious to you how one might support one of the premises in the argument, say so. You might even suggest a defence. This helps your peer see how the argument is being understood by the audience.

If you think there may be a good criticism of one or more of the premises that your peer has not considered, say so. This should be a conversation. It helps your peer if you're willing to play devil's advocate.

Again, please cc your peer's review to me so I can assign appropriate credit. And let me know if you have questions.

ITK Paper 2

Due electronically by midnight on Wednesday, March 14

Instructions

Convert your arguments into a paper. The main goal of your paper should be to critically assess an argument concerning knowledge that you extracted from one of the selections. Your paper must contain:
• Your name. Seriously.
• An introduction that tells the reader what you plan to do in your paper.
• A prose summary in your own words of the argument you plan to discuss. If you need to tell a little story in order to set up the argument, this is the place to do it.
• A more formal presentation of the argument you plan to discuss, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid.
• A premise-by-premise explanation and defence of the argument. Explain any technical terms and provide support for each premise. (Recall that what needs explaining depends on your audience. You should take your audience to be an intelligent, interested individual that is not in our class. Don’t assume I’m your audience.) Do not “tell me in other words” what the premise says. Do give me the best reasons you can think of for supposing the premise is correct, whether you think it is or not. Your defence of each premise should be your best answer the question Why think this premise is true?
• A criticism of some premise in the presented argument, explained informally in prose. The criticism should be the best one you can think of. I’m not looking for what others have said here. I’m interested in what you think the best criticism is, whether or not you think the first argument is sound.
• A more formal presentation of your criticism, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid. Its conclusion must be the negation of some premise in the first argument.
• An explanation and defence of the premises in your criticism. Same points that apply to explanation and defence of the first argument apply here as well.
• An overall evaluation: Is your criticism of the original argument sound? Why or why not?
• Citations where appropriate, and a list of references at the end of the paper in APA format. (You do not need to refer to any paper other than the ones excerpted below, though you may if it is appropriate.)

Papers should be submitted by email to chris.tillman@gmail.com as an attachment in .doc, .docx, .pdf, .rtf, or shared with me as a Google document by midnight, Wednesday March 14.

Sunday, March 04, 2012

Max on Schaffer on Debasing

(NB: I'm pasting Max's post in here since he had trouble. - Tillman)

Max W said...


My argument for The Debasing Demon:

Schaffer's Argument:

1: If I know T (A), then I can know that I know T (B)
2: If I can know that I know T (B), then I can know that my belief of T is properly based (C)
3: If I know T (A), then I can know that my belief of T is properly based (C) (HS 2, 3).
4: I cannot know that my belief of T is properly based (~C)
5: I do not know T (~A) (MT 4, 5).


Response to Schaffer:

1: ~(If I know T [A], then I can know that I know T [B])
2: If I can know that I know T (B), then I can know that my belief of T is properly based (C)
3: ~(If I know T [A], then I can know that my belief of T is properly based [C] [HS 2, 3]).
4: I cannot know that my belief of T is properly based (~C)
5: ~(I do not know T [~A] [MT 4, 5]).

(Works referenced: The Debasing Demon [Schaffer], Debasing Scepticism [Brueckner])

3:42 PM

Thursday, March 01, 2012

Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem
Ali Sarvi

Suppose that there is a possible world in which all the inhabitants are the Brains In a Vat (BIV) who are the victims of an evil demon; BIV’s experiences and beliefs are the same as our beliefs and experiences in the actual world; we both are thinking in the same way and forming an analogous belief on the basis of an analogous experience.
From this consideration, we can reasonably infer the New Evil Demon thesis (NED) as follows:
(NED): The beliefs of the brains in a vat are as justified as our beliefs.

Now consider the general formulation of reliabilism as follows:
(R): S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process.

(NED) raises a problem for reliabilism (R) which has been called the new evil demon problem. Here is the argument which shows the problem:

NED Argument:
1- Our beliefs in P are justified.
2- The beliefs of the brains in a vat are as justified as our beliefs (NED).
3- If (2) is true, then if (1) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is justified.
4- if (1) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is justified.
5- BIV’s belief in P is justified.
6- S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process (R)
7- If (6) is true, then if (5) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process.
8- If (5) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process
9- So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process

The conclusion of the argument is false, although the argument is valid; so some of the premises might be false. Let us suppose that we are not sceptics and so we will not reject premise 1. And also suppose that our above-mentioned consideration of the possible world of the brains in a vat plausibly implies that (NED) is true and so premise 2 is not rejected; although some may object to premise 2 in some other senses, but for our purpose we do not consider those objections. Hence, the only remained option to reject would be premise 6, i.e., (R).
Juan Comesana (2002)[1] wants to defend reliabilism and his strategy is to indicate that the (NED) argument is fallacious. He emphasizes that we should note that (R) has two different possible readings as follows:

R1: S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world.
R2: S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the world where it is used.
Then Comessana argues that if we reallege the above (NED) argument by means of R1 as premise 6, then the conclusion would be:
9*- So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world. Now it is obvious that 9* is true; because it asserts that the processes which BIV use in their world are reliable processes in the actual world, although they are unreliable in their world. For example a BIV uses vision perception to make her belief; and vision perception is a reliable process in the actual world since most of whose output would be true in the actual world. So, if we consider R1 as the appropriate reading of R, then NED argument is sound and the new evil problem for reliabilism would be perished.
On the other hand, if we consider R2 as the appropriate reading of R as premise 6, then the conclusion would be as follows:
9**: So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the BIV’s world.
It is obvious that 9** is false, because it asserts that the processes which BIV use in their world are reliable processes in the BIV’s world, but they are not reliable in that world since most of whose output would be false in the BIV’s world. Then Comesana suggests that since there are two different readings of R in premise 6 in the NED argument, so the argument is a fallacy of equivocation and hence the problem of the new evil demon is refuted.
Here is Comesana argument:

1- (R) is used in two different meanings in premise 6 of the NED argument.
2- If (1), then NED argument is a fallacy of equivocation.
3- Then NED argument is a fallacy of equivocation.

I think there is an objection to premise 1. Comesana declares that when a speaker utters that “process F is reliable”, her utterance has idenxical feature just as when she utters:“it is raining here”. The proposition of sentence “it is raining here” is true, for instance, in Winnipeg, but is false in Tehran (if it is not raining in Tehran). But we should note that although the proposition of sentence “it is raining here” has two different truth-value in two different places (i.e. true in Winnipeg and false in Tehran), it has just one and only one truth value in Winnipeg. Similarly, when S says “process F is reliable”, one utterance of it can be true, for instance, in the actual world where it conveys that “process F is reliable in the actual world”, but another utterance of it could be false in world w where it conveys “process F is reliable in world w”. But again we should notice that although the proposition of sentence “Process F is reliable” has two different truth-value in two different possible worlds (i.e. true in the actual world and false in the BIV’s world), it has just one and only one truth value in the actual world.
Therefore, we should say that (R) has just one and only one truth-value in the actual world, whereas Comesana says that (R) has two different truth value in the actual world.
Now we can allege the following argument against Comesana:

1- If (R) does not have two different readings with two different truth value in the actual world, then the NED argument is not a fallacy of equivocation.
2- (R) does not have two different readings with two different truth value in the actual world.
3- So, the NED argument is not a fallacy of equivocation.

But something is interesting here: If the only utterance of (R) in the actual world is R1 (S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world), then the conclusion of the NED argument is 9*:
9*: So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world
And, as it was mentioned earlier, 9* is true and so it seems that the NED argument is sound and we can say that the problem of NED is refuted.
But the problem is that the NED argument with R1 is not sound because R1 is simply false; R1 is false because there is some counterexample against it. Laurence BonJour’s example of clairvoyance is a counterexample for R1; because although clairvoyance is a reliable process for the clairvoyant to make her true beliefs, she is not justified in her beliefs.

















[1] “The Diagonal and the Demon”, Philosophical Studies 110 (3): 249-266.

A False Closure Principle

Here is my argument against a certain closure principle.

A Counter Example to the (RMC) Closure Principle

David Doerksen

Closure principles are principles meant to capture the idea that if you know some proposition that entails another, then you can come to know the entailed proposition. As intuitive as this sounds it turns out to be very hard to find the true closure principle. In ‘A closer Look at the Closure Principle’ Michael Blome-Tillmann shows us why he thinks many versions of the closure principle are false. At the end of the paper he presents what he thinks is the correct closure principle. I will only focus on two principles he talks about. They are (MC) and (RMC):

(MC) If you know that p and you know that if p then q, then possibly you know q.

(RMC) If you know that p and you know that if p then q and it is not the case that the set of all the worlds where not q is true are disjoint from the set of all the worlds where your perceptual experience and memory are different then at the actual world.

Dr. Blome-Tillmann thinks that (MC) is false because of what he calls Dretske’s intuition. This is the intuition that you cannot deduce the negation of sceptical hypothesis simply from an ordinary world proposition and the knowledge that the ordinary world proposition entails the negation of the sceptical hypothesis. If p is ‘this is a zebra’ and q is ‘this is not a cleverly painted mule’ and if ‘if p then q’ is true, we have a counter example to (MC). I can know p and I can know if p then q, but I can’t come to know q only on the basis of those two propositions. I need something else. The something else is what (RMC) introduces.

In the counter example to (MC) the problem is that in all the worlds where ~q is true, you would have the exact same perceptual experiences and memories in them as you do in the actual world. This means that all the ~q worlds are uneliminated for us. So (RMC) adds that the set of all the ~q worlds and the set of all the eliminated worlds must not be disjoint in order for us to be able to deduce q from knowing p and knowing if p then q. The upshot of (RMC) is that we cannot come to know sceptical hypotheses simply by deducing them from ordinary world propositions and so the sceptic cannot use the principle against us for the conclusion of scepticism (using transmission arguments that is). Here is Michael Blome-Tillmann’s argument:

P1) If (MC) is false for Dretske type intuitions and (RMC) does not have the same problems as (MC) then (RMC) is true

P2) (MC) is false for Dretske type intuitions and (RMC) does not have the same problems as (MC)

C) So, (RMC) is true.

I deny P1. This is because even if Michael Blome-Tillmann is correct about the antecedent, (RMC) is false on other grounds. If we accept Dretske’s intuition then we think we cannot conclude the negation of sceptical hypothesis from deducing them from ordinary world propositions. Presumably the way we come to know the negation of sceptical hypothesis if we have this intuition is by using phenomenal conservatism, inference to the best explanation or if the sceptical world is massively different to our perceptions and memories then they are in the actual world. Consider now a situation in which I know that this is a zebra and I know that if it is a zebra then it is not a cleverly painted mule. We will call the situation A. Now consider all the ~q worlds, that is all the worlds in which the animal is a cleverly painted mule. It is totally plausible that in one of these worlds the mule wasn’t so cleverly painted, but rather it has one extra stripe on it that the actual zebra does. But this means that in one of the ~q worlds our perceptual experience is not the same as it is in the actual world, so the set of all the ~q worlds are disjoint from the set of all the eliminated worlds. So all three conditions of the antecedent of (RMC) are satisfied, but it is still not the case that we can come to know that the animal is not a painted mule on the basis of these three things alone. The fact that the painted mule has one extra stripe cannot make the difference between us being able to tell that it’s a painted mule and not a zebra. Not all the zebras have exactly the same number of stripes. If we were in the situation where it was a painted mule with an extra stripe, we would not be able to say “hey that zebra looking thing has one extra strip then one of the zebra’s does in another situation we could be in, so it must not be a zebra”. That is absurd. But then all we are left for concluding that the animal is not a painted zebra is deducing it from ordinary world propositions that we know, but we already rejected that as a way to come to know that the animal is not a zebra. So this suffices as a counter example to (RMC) and that means that (RMC) is not the correct closure principle. Here is my argument:

P1) Situation A is a situation in which the antecedent of (RMC) is true and the consequent is false.

P2) If (P1) then (RMC) is false.

C) So (RMC) is false.

Johnathan Schaffer: "The debasing demon"

Here is my summary of one of Schaffer's arguments and then my corresponding argument against his. I'm not very confident in my argument against his but I had a lot of trouble coming up with one. Does anyone have any thoughts or suggestions?
- Kelly MacWilliam

Section 1: The argument as presented in Johnathan Schaffer’s article entitled “The debasing demon”

1) If I know proposition p then I have a true belief properly based on the evidence.

2) Any belief can be produced on an improper basis.

3) The debasing demon makes it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.

4) If (3) and (2) then I might be wrong about how I came to believe p.

5) Therefore, I might be wrong about how I came to believe p.

6) If (5) then I do not know that p.

7) Therefore, I do not know that p.

8) If (7) and (3) then for any proposition p, I do not know it.

9) Therefore, for any proposition p, I do not know it.

Section 2: My argument against Schaffer’s argument rejecting premise (8)

10) Either I am in the debasing demon scenario or I am not in the debasing demon scenario.

11) If I am in the debasing demon scenario then for any proposition p, I do not know it.

12) If I am not in the debasing demon scenario then if I have a belief that p, and p is true, and I believe the p on the basis of properly based evidence then I know it.

13) If (12) then (8) is false.

14) Therefore (8) is false.

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Arguments for Paper 2

Introduction to Theory of Knowledge
Winter 2012
Chris Tillman

Please choose one of the following papers. Extract the central argument from the paper and present it in numbered premise-conclusion form. If the paper is primarily replying to some other argument, present that argument in numbered premise-conclusion form as well. Make sure to specify which premise the author is rejecting.
Then present your own argument in numbered premise-conclusion form against one of the author’s premises. The arguments must be deductively valid. You can accompany the arguments with brief explanations/defences of the premises if they are required for intelligibility.

Arguments need to be submitted to me by midnight, February 29 via email to chris dot tillman at gmail dot com.

Reliabilism

Reliabilists have a generality problem. Comesana (2006) proposes a solution.
Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.

According to reliabilists about epistemic justification, what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have forcefully presented a problem for such reliabilism, "the generality problem."? The generality problem arises once we realize that the notion of reliability applies straightforwardly only to types of process--for only types of process are repeatable entities which can produce true or false beliefs in each of their instances. Moreover, any token process will be an instance of indefinitely many types of process. Which of these types must be reliable for my belief to be justified, according to reliabilism? That question, generalized to cover every case of belief-formation, is the generality problem for reliabilism. In this paper I propose a solution to the generality problem. The solution makes use of the basing relation, and so, given that it isn't clear how to characterize that relation, it might be thought to replace one problem with another. I argue that, however difficult it is to characterize the basing relation, every adequate epistemological theory must make use of it implicitly or explicitly. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory.

Reliabilists have a “new” evil demon problem. Comesana (2002) proposes a fix.
Juan Comesaña (2002). The Diagonal and the Demon. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.

Reliabilism about epistemic justification – the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation – must face two problems. First, what has been called ``the new evil demon problem'', which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not – the objector claims – reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is so appealing despite being false. I present a special version of reliabilism, ``indexical reliabilism'', based on two-dimensional semantics, and show how it can solve both problems.

Proper Functionalism

Michael Bergmann (2008) sets forth a new argument for proper functionalism.
Michael Bergmann (2008). Reidian Externalism. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.

What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.

Todd Long (2012) defends evidentialism from Bergmann (2006)’s critiques.
Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.
Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, and, relatedly, that mentalist evidentialism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of doxastic response B to evidence E is an essential property of B–E; and (iii) mentalist evidentialism is “unmotivated”. I object to each argument. The argument for (i) begs the question. The argument for (ii) suffers from the fact that mentalist evidentialists are not committed to the consequences claimed for them; nevertheless, I show that there is, in the neighborhood, a substantive dispute concerning the nature of doxastic epistemic fittingness. That dispute involves what I call “Necessary Fittingness”, the view that, necessarily, exactly one (at most) doxastic attitude ( belief , or disbelief , or suspension of judgment ) toward a proposition is epistemically fitting with respect to a person’s total evidence at any time. Reflection on my super-blooper epistemic design counterexamples to Bergmann’s proper function theory reveals both the plausibility of Necessary Fittingness and a good reason to deny (iii). Mentalist evidentialism is thus vindicated against the objections.

Rogers & Matheson (forthcoming) defend epistemic internalism from Bergmann (2006)’s critiques.
Jason Rogers & Jonathan Matheson (forthcoming). Bergmann's Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists. Philosophical Studies.
Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn. We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.

Skepticism

Jonathan Schaffer (2010) presents a new argument for skepticism: a universal skepticism on which even your knowledge that you exist is not safe.
Jonathan Schaffer (2010). The Debasing Demon. Analysis 70 (2):228-237.

What knowledge is imperilled by sceptical doubt? That is, what range of beliefs may be called into doubt by sceptical nightmares like the Cartesian demon hypothesis? It is generally thought that demons have limited powers, perhaps only threatening a posteriori knowledge of the external world, but at any rate not threatening principles like the cogito. I will argue that there is a demon – the debasing demon – with unlimited powers, which threatens universal doubt. Rather than deceiving us with falsities, the debasing demon would allow us true beliefs, but only as guesses.

Nick Bostrom (2003) considers the likelihood that you are a computer simulation.
Nick Bostrom (2003). Are We Living in a Computer Simulation? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243–255.

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.

Keith DeRose (1999) proposes a “contextualist” solution to skepticism.

Keith DeRose (1999). Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell Publishers.
In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism”. I’ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and also indicate some of the main positive motivations for accepting the view. Among the epistemologists I’ve spoken with who have an opinion on the matter, I think it’s fair to say a majority reject contextualism. However, the resistance has to this point been largely underground, with little by way of sustained arguments against contextualism appearing in the journals,[i] though I have begun to see various papers in manuscript form which are critical of contextualism. Here, I’ll respond the criticism of contextualism that, in my travels, I have found to be the most pervasive in producing suspicion about the view.

Jonathan Schaffer argues that if you like contextualism, you’ll love contrasitivism.
Jonathan Schaffer (2004). From Contextualism to Contrastivism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.

Contextualism treats ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats ‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory.

Michael Blome-Tillmann (2006) takes a closer look at “transmission” arguments for skepticism.

Michael Blome-Tillmann (2006). A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):381–390.

The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary proposition’ and ‘sceptical hypothesis’ respectively. (SKC), however, fails for familiar reasons: since knowledge entails belief (KB), we can derive the falsity (F) from (SKC) by hypothetical syllogism, and thus reduce (SKC) to absurdity: (KB) Kxt[p] → Bxt[p]. (F) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Bxt[q].

Fallibilism
Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.

In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ‘infallibilism’, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power than fallibilism. In particular, I argue that an infallibilist can easily explain why assertions of ‘p, but possibly not-p’ (where the ‘possibly’ is read as referring to epistemic possibility) is infelicitous in terms of the knowledge rule of assertion. But a fallibilist cannot. Furthermore, an infallibilist can explain the infelicity of utterances of ‘p, but I don't know that p’ and ‘p might be true, but I'm not willing to say that for all I know, p is true’, and why when a speaker thinks p is epistemically possible for her, she will agree (if asked) that for all she knows, p is true. The simplest explanation of these facts entails infallibilism. Fallibilists have tried and failed to explain the infelicity of ‘p, but I don't know that p’, but have not even attempted to explain the last two facts. I close by considering two facts that seem to pose a problem for infallibilism, and argue that they don't.

Stewart Cohen (2002) presses the problem of “easy knowledge”.
Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

Can you know it’s a red paper and not a white paper with a red light shone on it without checking further? If so, your knowledge is had too easily. If not, skepticism.

Phenomenal Conservatism

Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.
I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised.

Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases where, intuitively, they should not be able to do so. I argue that there are cases where a belief that p can behave like an appearance that p and thereby make it seem to one that p.

Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one.

Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings’. Those who defend the view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They can deny that their view forces them to condone morally abhorrent behavior, but then they undercut the defenses of their own view.

Crispin Wright (2007). The Perils of Dogmatism. In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
"Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...) it would pre-empt any role in the diagnosis and treatment of sceptical paradoxes for the kind of notion of entitlement (rational, non-evidential warrant) I have proposed elsewhere [Wright 2004]. But my overarching contention will be that Dogmatism is, generally and locally, too problematic a stance to be helpful in that project.