My Attempt against Debasing Demon

Schaffer’s argument:

1) (1) Knowledge requires the production of belief properly based on the evidence.

2) (2) Necessarily, for all beliefs, they can be produced improperly based on the evidence, via guessing or wishful thinking.

3) (3) Necessarily, for all improperly formed beliefs, it is always possible for them to seem later as if one had produced the belief properly based on the evidence.

4) (4) If (1)-(3), then it is impossible to distinguish cases of knowledge from cases of non-knowledge.

5) (5) So, it is impossible to distinguish cases of knowledge from cases of non-knowledge.

My argument denying (3):

6) (6) It is not always possible for improperly formed beliefs to seem later as if one had produced the belief properly.

7) (7) If (6), then it is sometimes possible to distinguish cases of knowledge from non-knowledge.

8) (8) So, it is sometimes possible to distinguish cases of knowledge from non-knowledge.

C. Smoke attempts debasing demon arguments

Here's my attempt at the debasing demon argument:

Argument

(1) Knowledge requires the production of belief, properly based on the evidence, and any belief can be produced on an improper basis.

(2) If (1), then it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.

(3) Therefore, it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.

(4) When one forms a belief, the debasing demon makes it seem as though it is properly based on the evidence, where it is not properly based on the evidence.

(5) If (3) and (4), then it is the case that no matter what belief you form, there is always the possibility that you cannot be certain that the connection between your belief and evidence is properly based.

(6) Therefore, it is the case that no matter what belief you form, there is always the possibility that you cannot be certain that the connection between your belief and evidence is properly based.


Reply

(1) I believe I exist.

(2) If it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence, and when one forms a belief, the debasing demon makes it seem as though it is properly based on the evidence, where it is not properly based on the evidence, then (1) is based on improper evidence.

(3) It is not the case that (1) is be based on improper evidence.

(4) Therefore, it is not the case that it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence, and when one forms a belief, the debasing demon makes it seem as though it is properly based on the evidence, where it is not properly based on the evidence.

Peer Evaluation

Please check your peer's arguments for deductive validity. It's best if the arguments are represented as fairly simple deductively valid arguments. (Modus ponens, modus tollens, conjunction, and hypothetical syllogism are all commonly used argument forms.) If your peer's argument is invalid, suggest ways of making the argument valid.

Your peer's arguments may also suffer from idle premises: premises that are not required in order to deductively secure the conclusion. Look for these and if you find one, suggest your peer omits it.

Your peer's premises should also make sense to you, whether or not you also worked on your peer's target paper. Trust yourself. If a premise does not make clear sense, don't be shy about saying so. It helps to explain exactly what you find unclear.

If it's mysterious to you how one might support one of the premises in the argument, say so. You might even suggest a defence. This helps your peer see how the argument is being understood by the audience.

If you think there may be a good criticism of one or more of the premises that your peer has not considered, say so. This should be a conversation. It helps your peer if you're willing to play devil's advocate.

Again, please cc your peer's review to me so I can assign appropriate credit. And let me know if you have questions.

ITK Paper 2

Due electronically by midnight on Wednesday, March 14

Instructions

Convert your arguments into a paper. The main goal of your paper should be to critically assess an argument concerning knowledge that you extracted from one of the selections. Your paper must contain:
• Your name. Seriously.
• An introduction that tells the reader what you plan to do in your paper.
• A prose summary in your own words of the argument you plan to discuss. If you need to tell a little story in order to set up the argument, this is the place to do it.
• A more formal presentation of the argument you plan to discuss, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid.
• A premise-by-premise explanation and defence of the argument. Explain any technical terms and provide support for each premise. (Recall that what needs explaining depends on your audience. You should take your audience to be an intelligent, interested individual that is not in our class. Don’t assume I’m your audience.) Do not “tell me in other words” what the premise says. Do give me the best reasons you can think of for supposing the premise is correct, whether you think it is or not. Your defence of each premise should be your best answer the question Why think this premise is true?
• A criticism of some premise in the presented argument, explained informally in prose. The criticism should be the best one you can think of. I’m not looking for what others have said here. I’m interested in what you think the best criticism is, whether or not you think the first argument is sound.
• A more formal presentation of your criticism, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid. Its conclusion must be the negation of some premise in the first argument.
• An explanation and defence of the premises in your criticism. Same points that apply to explanation and defence of the first argument apply here as well.
• An overall evaluation: Is your criticism of the original argument sound? Why or why not?
• Citations where appropriate, and a list of references at the end of the paper in APA format. (You do not need to refer to any paper other than the ones excerpted below, though you may if it is appropriate.)

Papers should be submitted by email to chris.tillman@gmail.com as an attachment in .doc, .docx, .pdf, .rtf, or shared with me as a Google document by midnight, Wednesday March 14.

Max on Schaffer on Debasing

(NB: I'm pasting Max's post in here since he had trouble. - Tillman)

Max W said...


My argument for The Debasing Demon:

Schaffer's Argument:

1: If I know T (A), then I can know that I know T (B)
2: If I can know that I know T (B), then I can know that my belief of T is properly based (C)
3: If I know T (A), then I can know that my belief of T is properly based (C) (HS 2, 3).
4: I cannot know that my belief of T is properly based (~C)
5: I do not know T (~A) (MT 4, 5).


Response to Schaffer:

1: ~(If I know T [A], then I can know that I know T [B])
2: If I can know that I know T (B), then I can know that my belief of T is properly based (C)
3: ~(If I know T [A], then I can know that my belief of T is properly based [C] [HS 2, 3]).
4: I cannot know that my belief of T is properly based (~C)
5: ~(I do not know T [~A] [MT 4, 5]).

(Works referenced: The Debasing Demon [Schaffer], Debasing Scepticism [Brueckner])

3:42 PM

Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem
Ali Sarvi

Suppose that there is a possible world in which all the inhabitants are the Brains In a Vat (BIV) who are the victims of an evil demon; BIV’s experiences and beliefs are the same as our beliefs and experiences in the actual world; we both are thinking in the same way and forming an analogous belief on the basis of an analogous experience.
From this consideration, we can reasonably infer the New Evil Demon thesis (NED) as follows:
(NED): The beliefs of the brains in a vat are as justified as our beliefs.

Now consider the general formulation of reliabilism as follows:
(R): S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process.

(NED) raises a problem for reliabilism (R) which has been called the new evil demon problem. Here is the argument which shows the problem:

NED Argument:
1- Our beliefs in P are justified.
2- The beliefs of the brains in a vat are as justified as our beliefs (NED).
3- If (2) is true, then if (1) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is justified.
4- if (1) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is justified.
5- BIV’s belief in P is justified.
6- S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process (R)
7- If (6) is true, then if (5) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process.
8- If (5) is true, then BIV’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process
9- So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a reliable process

The conclusion of the argument is false, although the argument is valid; so some of the premises might be false. Let us suppose that we are not sceptics and so we will not reject premise 1. And also suppose that our above-mentioned consideration of the possible world of the brains in a vat plausibly implies that (NED) is true and so premise 2 is not rejected; although some may object to premise 2 in some other senses, but for our purpose we do not consider those objections. Hence, the only remained option to reject would be premise 6, i.e., (R).
Juan Comesana (2002)[1] wants to defend reliabilism and his strategy is to indicate that the (NED) argument is fallacious. He emphasizes that we should note that (R) has two different possible readings as follows:

R1: S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world.
R2: S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the world where it is used.
Then Comessana argues that if we reallege the above (NED) argument by means of R1 as premise 6, then the conclusion would be:
9*- So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world. Now it is obvious that 9* is true; because it asserts that the processes which BIV use in their world are reliable processes in the actual world, although they are unreliable in their world. For example a BIV uses vision perception to make her belief; and vision perception is a reliable process in the actual world since most of whose output would be true in the actual world. So, if we consider R1 as the appropriate reading of R, then NED argument is sound and the new evil problem for reliabilism would be perished.
On the other hand, if we consider R2 as the appropriate reading of R as premise 6, then the conclusion would be as follows:
9**: So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the BIV’s world.
It is obvious that 9** is false, because it asserts that the processes which BIV use in their world are reliable processes in the BIV’s world, but they are not reliable in that world since most of whose output would be false in the BIV’s world. Then Comesana suggests that since there are two different readings of R in premise 6 in the NED argument, so the argument is a fallacy of equivocation and hence the problem of the new evil demon is refuted.
Here is Comesana argument:

1- (R) is used in two different meanings in premise 6 of the NED argument.
2- If (1), then NED argument is a fallacy of equivocation.
3- Then NED argument is a fallacy of equivocation.

I think there is an objection to premise 1. Comesana declares that when a speaker utters that “process F is reliable”, her utterance has idenxical feature just as when she utters:“it is raining here”. The proposition of sentence “it is raining here” is true, for instance, in Winnipeg, but is false in Tehran (if it is not raining in Tehran). But we should note that although the proposition of sentence “it is raining here” has two different truth-value in two different places (i.e. true in Winnipeg and false in Tehran), it has just one and only one truth value in Winnipeg. Similarly, when S says “process F is reliable”, one utterance of it can be true, for instance, in the actual world where it conveys that “process F is reliable in the actual world”, but another utterance of it could be false in world w where it conveys “process F is reliable in world w”. But again we should notice that although the proposition of sentence “Process F is reliable” has two different truth-value in two different possible worlds (i.e. true in the actual world and false in the BIV’s world), it has just one and only one truth value in the actual world.
Therefore, we should say that (R) has just one and only one truth-value in the actual world, whereas Comesana says that (R) has two different truth value in the actual world.
Now we can allege the following argument against Comesana:

1- If (R) does not have two different readings with two different truth value in the actual world, then the NED argument is not a fallacy of equivocation.
2- (R) does not have two different readings with two different truth value in the actual world.
3- So, the NED argument is not a fallacy of equivocation.

But something is interesting here: If the only utterance of (R) in the actual world is R1 (S’s belief in P is justified if and only if S’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world), then the conclusion of the NED argument is 9*:
9*: So, BIV’s belief in P is caused by a process which is reliable in the actual world
And, as it was mentioned earlier, 9* is true and so it seems that the NED argument is sound and we can say that the problem of NED is refuted.
But the problem is that the NED argument with R1 is not sound because R1 is simply false; R1 is false because there is some counterexample against it. Laurence BonJour’s example of clairvoyance is a counterexample for R1; because although clairvoyance is a reliable process for the clairvoyant to make her true beliefs, she is not justified in her beliefs.

















[1] “The Diagonal and the Demon”, Philosophical Studies 110 (3): 249-266.

A False Closure Principle

Here is my argument against a certain closure principle.

A Counter Example to the (RMC) Closure Principle

David Doerksen

Closure principles are principles meant to capture the idea that if you know some proposition that entails another, then you can come to know the entailed proposition. As intuitive as this sounds it turns out to be very hard to find the true closure principle. In ‘A closer Look at the Closure Principle’ Michael Blome-Tillmann shows us why he thinks many versions of the closure principle are false. At the end of the paper he presents what he thinks is the correct closure principle. I will only focus on two principles he talks about. They are (MC) and (RMC):

(MC) If you know that p and you know that if p then q, then possibly you know q.

(RMC) If you know that p and you know that if p then q and it is not the case that the set of all the worlds where not q is true are disjoint from the set of all the worlds where your perceptual experience and memory are different then at the actual world.

Dr. Blome-Tillmann thinks that (MC) is false because of what he calls Dretske’s intuition. This is the intuition that you cannot deduce the negation of sceptical hypothesis simply from an ordinary world proposition and the knowledge that the ordinary world proposition entails the negation of the sceptical hypothesis. If p is ‘this is a zebra’ and q is ‘this is not a cleverly painted mule’ and if ‘if p then q’ is true, we have a counter example to (MC). I can know p and I can know if p then q, but I can’t come to know q only on the basis of those two propositions. I need something else. The something else is what (RMC) introduces.

In the counter example to (MC) the problem is that in all the worlds where ~q is true, you would have the exact same perceptual experiences and memories in them as you do in the actual world. This means that all the ~q worlds are uneliminated for us. So (RMC) adds that the set of all the ~q worlds and the set of all the eliminated worlds must not be disjoint in order for us to be able to deduce q from knowing p and knowing if p then q. The upshot of (RMC) is that we cannot come to know sceptical hypotheses simply by deducing them from ordinary world propositions and so the sceptic cannot use the principle against us for the conclusion of scepticism (using transmission arguments that is). Here is Michael Blome-Tillmann’s argument:

P1) If (MC) is false for Dretske type intuitions and (RMC) does not have the same problems as (MC) then (RMC) is true

P2) (MC) is false for Dretske type intuitions and (RMC) does not have the same problems as (MC)

C) So, (RMC) is true.

I deny P1. This is because even if Michael Blome-Tillmann is correct about the antecedent, (RMC) is false on other grounds. If we accept Dretske’s intuition then we think we cannot conclude the negation of sceptical hypothesis from deducing them from ordinary world propositions. Presumably the way we come to know the negation of sceptical hypothesis if we have this intuition is by using phenomenal conservatism, inference to the best explanation or if the sceptical world is massively different to our perceptions and memories then they are in the actual world. Consider now a situation in which I know that this is a zebra and I know that if it is a zebra then it is not a cleverly painted mule. We will call the situation A. Now consider all the ~q worlds, that is all the worlds in which the animal is a cleverly painted mule. It is totally plausible that in one of these worlds the mule wasn’t so cleverly painted, but rather it has one extra stripe on it that the actual zebra does. But this means that in one of the ~q worlds our perceptual experience is not the same as it is in the actual world, so the set of all the ~q worlds are disjoint from the set of all the eliminated worlds. So all three conditions of the antecedent of (RMC) are satisfied, but it is still not the case that we can come to know that the animal is not a painted mule on the basis of these three things alone. The fact that the painted mule has one extra stripe cannot make the difference between us being able to tell that it’s a painted mule and not a zebra. Not all the zebras have exactly the same number of stripes. If we were in the situation where it was a painted mule with an extra stripe, we would not be able to say “hey that zebra looking thing has one extra strip then one of the zebra’s does in another situation we could be in, so it must not be a zebra”. That is absurd. But then all we are left for concluding that the animal is not a painted zebra is deducing it from ordinary world propositions that we know, but we already rejected that as a way to come to know that the animal is not a zebra. So this suffices as a counter example to (RMC) and that means that (RMC) is not the correct closure principle. Here is my argument:

P1) Situation A is a situation in which the antecedent of (RMC) is true and the consequent is false.

P2) If (P1) then (RMC) is false.

C) So (RMC) is false.

Johnathan Schaffer: "The debasing demon"

Here is my summary of one of Schaffer's arguments and then my corresponding argument against his. I'm not very confident in my argument against his but I had a lot of trouble coming up with one. Does anyone have any thoughts or suggestions?
- Kelly MacWilliam

Section 1: The argument as presented in Johnathan Schaffer’s article entitled “The debasing demon”

1) If I know proposition p then I have a true belief properly based on the evidence.

2) Any belief can be produced on an improper basis.

3) The debasing demon makes it is always possible, when a belief is produced on an improper basis, for it to seem later as if one had produced a belief properly based on the evidence.

4) If (3) and (2) then I might be wrong about how I came to believe p.

5) Therefore, I might be wrong about how I came to believe p.

6) If (5) then I do not know that p.

7) Therefore, I do not know that p.

8) If (7) and (3) then for any proposition p, I do not know it.

9) Therefore, for any proposition p, I do not know it.

Section 2: My argument against Schaffer’s argument rejecting premise (8)

10) Either I am in the debasing demon scenario or I am not in the debasing demon scenario.

11) If I am in the debasing demon scenario then for any proposition p, I do not know it.

12) If I am not in the debasing demon scenario then if I have a belief that p, and p is true, and I believe the p on the basis of properly based evidence then I know it.

13) If (12) then (8) is false.

14) Therefore (8) is false.