Theory of Knowledge

Welcome Back!

2012-01-03T22:31:00.001-08:00

Here is Alvin Goldman's excellent paper on reliabilism, 'What Is Justified Belief?'

Williamses

2011-10-30T19:31:00.000-07:00

Here is Clifford's paper.

Here is James's paper.

Paper Assignment 1

2011-10-19T12:50:00.000-07:00

Introduction to Theory of Knowledge Paper 1
Due electronically by midnight on Wednesday, November 2
Instructions
Write a paper on one of the following topics. The main goal of your paper should be to critically assess an argument concerning knowledge that can be extracted from one of the following selections. Your paper must contain:
• Your name. Seriously.
• An introduction that tells the reader what you plan to do in your paper.
• A prose summary in your own words of the argument you plan to discuss. If you need to tell a little story in order to set up the argument, this is the place to do it.
• A more formal presentation of the argument you plan to discuss, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid.
• A premise-by-premise explanation and defence of the argument. Explain any technical terms and provide support for each premise. (Recall that what needs explaining depends on your audience. You should take your audience to be an intelligent, interested individual that is not in our class. Don’t assume I’m your audience.) Do not “tell me in other words” what the premise says. Do give me the best reasons you can think of for supposing the premise is correct, whether you think it is or not. Your defence of each premise should be your best answer the question Why think this premise is true?
• A criticism of some premise in the presented argument, explained informally in prose. The criticism should be the best one you can think of. I’m not looking for what others have said here. I’m interested in what you think the best criticism is, whether or not you think the first argument is sound.
• A more formal presentation of your criticism, presented in numbered premise-conclusion form. The argument must be deductively valid. Its conclusion must be the negation of some premise in the first argument.
• An explanation and defence of the premises in your criticism. Same points that apply to explanation and defence of the first argument apply here as well.
• An overall evaluation: Is your criticism of the original argument sound? Why or why not?
• Citations where appropriate, and a list of references at the end of the paper in APA format. (You do not need to refer to any paper other than the ones excerpted below, though you may if it is appropriate.)
Papers should be submitted by email to chris.tillman@gmail.com as an attachment in .doc, .docx, .pdf, .rtf, or shared with me as a gohttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifogle document by midnight, Wednesday November 2.

Option 1: What Good are Counterexamples? A Defence of TAK
In ‘What Good are Counterexamples?’ Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinburg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, attempts a defence of the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge against Gettier cases. Present and critically evaluate Weatherson’s main argument in defence of TAK.
Weatherson, Brian. 2003. ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’ Philosohical Studies 115(1): 1-31.

Option 2: Developing Feldman’s Modest Proposal
At the end of Chapter 3, Feldman puts forward a “modest proposal”: (EDF) S knows P =df (i) P is true, (ii) S believes P, (iii) S is justified in believing P, and (iv) S’s justification for P does not essentially depend on any falsehood. We said this proposal needs to be clearer before we can properly ehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifvaluate it. Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison, philosophy professors at SUNY-Fredonia, attempt just that in Feit and Cullison (2011). In sections (1-3) (pp. 283-291) of their paper Feit and Cullison develop the best version of (EDF) they can think of and argue that it is false. Critically evaluate Feit and Cullison’s argument.
Feit, Neil and Andrew Cullison. 2011. ‘When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 283-304.

Option 3: Evaluating DJDD
In the remainder of their paper, Feit and Cuhttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifllison (2011) try to develop the “no false grounds” approach in a way that improves on what they take to be the best version of (EDF). The view they settle on is what they call the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ view (DJDD) S knows P iff (i) S believes P, (ii) P is true, (iii) S is justified in believing P, and (iv) no ground that is essential to S’s justification for P justifies S in believing the negation of a defeater. Critically assess their defence of DJDD. They consider some objections and offer replies. Evaluate whether their replies are successful or provide an objection of your own that Feit and Cullison do not consider to DJDD.
Feit, Neil and Andrew Cullison. 2011. ‘When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 283-304.

Option 4: Defeat
The main early competitor to the “no false grounds” approach to knowledge was the “no defeater” approach. The basic idea was that in Gettier cases, there is some true proposition such that if the subject knew it, she would lose justification for her belief. So the thought was that knowledge rehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifquires that there not be anything like that. We presented a precise proposal, (ND), which Lehrer and Paxson (1969) counterexampled. They proposed their own account of defeat. Swain (1974) criticizes Lehrer and Paxon’s account and proposes his own. Critically evaluate Swain’s criticism of Lehrer and Paxton or present your own objection to Swain’s account of defeat.
Swain, Marshall. 1974. ‘Epistemic Defeasibility’. American Philosophical Quarterly 11(1): 15-25.

Option 5: Your Favourite Theory of Knowledge is Wrong
Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinburg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, posted the following to his blog, Thoughts, Arguments and Rants (http://tar.weatherson.org/) on November 19, 2009:
Consider this proposition:
N: Brian does not know that N.
Assume N is false. That is, I know that N. Knowledge is factive, so N. That contradicts our original assumption. So N must not be false. So it follows, at least classically, that N is true. So I don’t know N.
But I can follow the reasoning that showed N is true. And I accept that reasoning, so I believe N. And the reasoning justifies me in believing N. So I have a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge. So the JTB theory of knowledge fails.
My reasoning didn’t go via any false lemmas. It went via a false assumption, but making false assumptions for purposes of reductio is consistent with knowledge. So I have a JTB with no false lemmas, but no knowledge. So much for the JTB+No false lemmas.
[Ernest Sosa (2007) holds that there are two kinds of knowledge: animal knowledge and reflective knowledge.
Subject S has animal knowledge that P if and only if S's belief that P is accurate (true), adroit (manifests an epistemic virtue, skill or competence) and apt (true because competent). Since aptness entails accuracy and adroitness, animal knowledge is apt belief.
S has reflective knowledge that P if and only if: (i) S's belief that P is apt (S has animal knowledge); (ii) S believes that ‘his belief that P is apt’; (iii) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself accurate (true); (iv) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself adroit (manifests a virtue); and (v) S's belief that ‘his belief that P is apt’ is itself apt (true because virtuous). –CT]
I’m (generally) a competent logical reasoner. My belief in N, which is a true belief, was a product of my logical competence. Indeed, I formed the belief in N, rather than some alternative, because of that competence.http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif So I should have Sosa-style animal knowledge of N. Indeed, I can reflectively, and aptly, endorse the claim that my belief in N is accurate because it was an exercise of competence. So I should have Sosa-style reflective knowledge that N. But I don’t; clearly I don’t know N.
It seems to me that pretty much any otherwise plausible theory of knowledge will fall this way. Whatever qualities or virtues a belief might have, short of knowledge, my belief in N has. But I don’t know N. Indeed, logic prevents me from knowing N. So any such theory must be false.
Critically assess Weatherson’s argument.
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Web-Only Bonus! Option 6: Critically evaluate a central argument in Jason Stanley's 'Knowing (How)'.

K > B

2011-09-26T12:43:00.000-07:00

Here are two more cases that can be used to mount an argument against the thesis that knowledge requires belief. They are similar, but their differences may or may not be important:

The Pub Quiz
Tim has no recollection of facts of English history. On a pub quiz, the question is ‘When did James I die?” Tim answers 1625. The answer was correct. Tim had no confidence in his answer. The quiz master asks, How did you know that?

The Unconfident Examinee
Jill, a student, completely lacks confidence in her answers on the quiz. She takes herself to be guessing the answer, but reliably answers every question correctly. Did Jill know them without believing them?

Thoughts?

Cross-Linguistic Data on 'Knows'

2011-09-25T18:38:00.000-07:00

In class we discussed a test for semantic ambiguity: if there is a natural language that translates some English word w using two different words, that is evidence for w's being semantically ambiguous. For example, 'bank' in English, when used to mean what 'financial institution' means, is translated into German as 'Bank'. And when that English string is used to mean the side of a river, it is translated as 'Ufer'.

I claimed that 'know' when used to mean knowledge of an individual is translated in German as 'kennen', and propositional uses of 'know' are translated as 'wissen', and this is perhaps some reason to think that it's an accident of English that both relations are expressed using 'knows'. This, in turn, may help explain our difficulties in characterizing knowing an individual in terms of propositional knowledge.

It turns out that the linguistic facts are a bit more complicated. In fact, one can accurately translate 'I know you' using 'wissen'. And one also translates 'I know who you are' using 'wissen'. But, surprisingly perhaps, 'I don't know you' only translates using 'kennen', and 'I don't know who you are' only translates using 'wissen'. (Recall Justin asked if knowing an individual is expressed in German in the same way that knowing-who is. The answer is 'no', but what I said was not entirely accurate. Thanks, Justin, for the question!)

As indicated below, a number of philosophers hold that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge, though, of course, it's controversial. In 'Know (How)' by Jason Stanley, linked below, Jason Stanley considers these sorts of cross-linguistic objections to the view that know-how is propositional. He points out that German may not be a good test case for know-how, since the grammar of German prevents know-how claims from taking infinitives as complements. What that means is this: In English, know-how claims typically have this sort of form: S knows how to BLAH. A phrase of the form /to BLAH/ is an infinitive. So since the German grammar is quite different from English in this case, it's probably not a good guide to figuring out whether know-how and propositional knowledge are really different knowledge-relations in English.

Interestingly, some languages (Cantonese and Russian) use different expressions for know-how than they do for propositional knowledge. And as many of you may know, French constructions allow infinitive complements, but they differ significantly in surface structure from English know-how claims. Stanley considers whether these count against his view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge in sections 6-8. Section 8 in particular focuses on the Cantonese-and-Russian objection. (The funny symbol he uses but does not explain is called 'lambda'. It works a bit like variable-binding expressions from quantified logic (quantifiers). You can get a hang of how it works by looking at the first few slides from Jeff Pelletier here. It's not super important to the discussion though.)

Knowing How

2011-09-24T15:12:00.000-07:00

There is quite a lot of recent work on procedural knowledge, and in class Friday we only touched the tip of the iceberg. (As is often the case, the rabbit holes run very deep with philosophical issues, and we don't have time to pursue them fully in class.) Recent literature on know-how largely stems from reactions to Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's 2001 paper, "Knowing How", though the debate is, of course, an ancient one. Stanley and Williamson, unlike Feldman, and contrary to the views expressed in class, defend the view that procedural knowledge is simply a species of propositional knowledge!

A decade of debate later, a paper published this year by Jason Stanley, "Knowing (How)" revisits the case made in the 2001 paper and the criticisms raised against it.

For a brief overview of the issues, see Jeremy Fantl's "Knowing-How and Knowing-That". (Accessible through U of M libraries.)

Further thoughts on know-how?

Bachelors and Analysis

2011-09-20T10:32:00.001-07:00

(This is a post by Ali that I'm moving here so it can get more attention. -CT)

Regarding our discussion in the last class about "All bachelors are unmarried male" I think we should note that:

The proposition " All bachelors are unmarried male ", is a kind of a priori conceptual truth which is true by its definition, i.e. its truth does not depend on the external world. So, for finding a counterexample for the analysis containing these kinds of analytic propositions we should not look at the world ( such as unmarried Hats, Robots, Monkeys, dead people and etc.), just as the proposition " 3+5=8" for which we do not need the experience to prove its truth or falsehood.

Refuting the Standard View

2011-09-20T10:24:00.000-07:00

(This is a post from Joel F that I'm moving out of the comments in order for it to get more attention. -CT)

This is something I was thinking about: For the skeptic to refute the standard view, he must do so by means of the standard view. In other words, he must use his rationality to come up with arguments against it. However, if rationality (the means of the standard view) is not a reliable source of justification, then the arguments against the standard view are themselves not justified. So, one must use a different means to refute the standard view. It does not seem possible to refute something without using rationality, thus it is impossible to refute the standard view.

Knowing Who x Is

2011-09-19T11:28:00.000-07:00

Today we considered the following account of knowing-who:

S knows who x is
iff
S knows an answer to the question, who is x?
iff
S knows a proposition of the form, x is F

This account has the following attractive feature: It analyzes knowing who in terms of propositional knowledge.

It may have the following unattractive feature: It's false.

It may be false because we need to restrict F to some special set of features. It may be false because we have to restrict F to some special features with respect to a context, or with respect to y's practical interests. It may be false because there is no analysis of knowing who in terms of propositional knowledge.

This is a good place to elaborate on complaints. In class I mentioned David Braun's 'Now You Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is'. It defends the above view.

Welcome!

2011-08-31T11:09:00.000-07:00

Welcome to the class blog for Theory of Knowledge! You'll find some useful links under the brain in a vat.